

ASSOCIATED PRESS
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By G.G. LaBelle
WASHINGTON
Law Suit - Nicaragua

The U.S. government is illegally aiding Nicaraguan rebels and causing the murder and torture of the Central American nation's citizens, according to a lawsuit filed Tuesday by a public interest law firm.

The Center for Constitutional Rights announced it filed the suit in U.S. District Court here on behalf of seven Nicaraguans, Rep. Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., and two Florida citizens who maintain that alleged training camps for the rebel forces in the state violate its laws.

The suit seeks \$2 million in damages for each plaintiff and a court order directing the U.S. government to stop the alleged assistance to Nicaraguan rebels.

Defendants in the suit include President Reagan, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey, five other U.S. officials, and a number of individuals and groups allegedly working toward the overthrow of the leftist government of Nicaragua. Reagan left Tuesday on a five-day, four-nation tour of Latin America.

Michael Ratner, a lawyer for the center, told a news conference that the Reagan administration was part of a "wide-ranging conspiracy" to terrorize Nicaraguan citizens and weaken the Central American nation's government.

"This is not some abstract idea of destabilizing the government," he said. "There are people, citizens of Nicaragua who are being harmed, killed, raped, tortured."

Sarah Wunsch, another center lawyer, said the plaintiffs included two women who had lost their husbands in raids on Nicaraguan villages near the Honduras border, a woman raped during such an incident, and a 15-year-old girl who lost an arm in one attack.

The U.S. government has repeatedly refused to comment on news articles maintaining the it is supplying aid to Nicaraguan rebels who were attacking from bases in Honduras.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders, one of the defendants named in the suit, refused to testify before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee last August on whether the United States was aiding Nicaraguan rebels.

State Department spokesman John Hughes said on Nov. 1, "It is the United States government policy not to address reports dealing with intelligence questions or allegations of covert activities."

However, lawyers for the Center for Constitutional Rights pointed to a Nov. 2 article in the New York Times that quoted unnamed Reagan administration officials as saying the CIA was supplying money to rebel groups to harass the Nicaraguan government. Hughes was also reported as saying the U.S. aid was not intended to overthrow the regime.

ESSAY

The N.S.C. After Clark

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Why are we reading so much about the grand strategies of former National Security Advisers?

Almost every news magazine expounds the views of "Kissco," the intellectual power conglomerate elongating the shadow of Henry Kissinger, which now employs former National Security Council head Brent Scowcroft and is likely soon to employ the State Department's Lawrence Eagleburger. Kissco both shapes U.S. policy and passes editorial judgment on it, like a playwright writing rave reviews for his own show.

Though Kissco dominates, other former advisers are appearing on op-ed pages. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's Pole Vault, is feverishly dealing China cards to any editor who will play; Richard Allen, who in 1978 introduced Ronald Reagan to the men who now head Germany and Japan, produces articles on strategies toward that axis of our allies.

The reason guru-grabbing has come into such vogue is that a strategy vacuum exists within the divided Reagan White House. The man of limited foreign policy experience who today holds the title of National Security Adviser — William Clark, the deep-background-only judge and crony of the President — is living proof that still waters can run shallow.

According to one regular participant at the early-morning White House staff meetings, Mr. Clark's most frequent utterance is "I'll have guidance by 10" — that is, he will provide the President's spokesmen with a decision on some pressing question by 10 A.M., after a more experienced guide has guided the adviser toward what guidance to give.

The adviser's adviser is the *weltanschauung*-free Colonel "Bud" McFarland. Because Mr. Clark was traumatized 18 months ago at a Senate hearing, and has not since dared to answer questions in public, the job of explicator has fallen to a gruff, grim-faced marine colonel; like many a brave man forced into paper-pushing work, Colonel McFarland is maladroit at the articulation of policy.

This curious state of affairs at the heart of what is supposed to be foreign-affairs coordination will not long continue. The N.S.C. will get a new head as soon as Ronald Reagan stares down into the chasm that divides his White House staff.

One Reagan White House is headed by James Baker and Michael Deaver (the pragmatist and the publicist) supported by Nancy Reagan; the other is headed by the President's favorite pair of old shoes, William Clark and Ed Meese. The internal quaking has reached nine points on the Sears scale and the policy paralysis has become embarrassing.

Soon the President will make his management decision with that characteristic clomp! and it is my guess that the Clark-Meese combo will come out on top. (Firing Nancy will be the hard part.) When Mr. Clark replaces Mr. Baker as chief of staff, the way will finally be clear to hire a real National Security Adviser.

Requirements should be (a) a cohesive world view, with a mindset close to Mr. Reagan's (b) long-established international connections (c) ability to swim through schools of bureaucratic sharks. Since George Bush, the natural choice, has political assignments and ambitions, let us survey the rest of the field:

Among Defense officials, John Lehman or Richard Perle would bring intellectual force and luster to the job, but the choice of either might be resisted by George Shultz, who prefers to quietly dominate the N.S.C.; Under Secretary Fred Ikle, with a lower profile, has a better chance.

Former Ambassador Lawrence Silberman has the credentials, and State might hold still for him, but the C.I.A.'s William Casey would probably counter with David Abshire, an older establishmentarian. If Donald Rumsfeld's name were mentioned, Kissco would rush in with Richard Kennedy. Richard Pipes is headed back to Harvard and to book contracts. Richard Burt has his hands full getting conservative support for his current nomination; Ambassador Ken Adelman is a few years away; Frank Carlucci (like Larry Eagleburger) needs to make some money; and Edward Luttwak is too brilliant and outspoken.

A signal that Mr. Reagan intended to run again would be his choice of U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who could carry his national-security message within and without the Administration. Hawks admire her brains and guts, and although Arabists at State are suspicious, she has shown an ability to work with Mr. Shultz as well as Mr. Clark.

The man with the inside track to head a rejuvenated N.S.C. is Tom Reed, a former Air Force Secretary who is frequently in and out of the White House basement; he gets along with the Californians and has produced at least one fairly good strategic paper.

It seems that the Administration must first grind to a halt before Mr. Reagan is moved to make the Roosevelt Room resemble the last scene in Hamlet. After the Great Staff Shake-Up, we will get more of our strategic thinking from a National Security Adviser of the present rather than the past.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 NOVEMBER 1982

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-6**WASHINGTON TALK****Briefing***Lunch at the Club*

Some of the choicest power-tripping in town often begins with a casual, "Meet me for lunch at the Metropolitan Club."

The reference is to the oldest and most exclusive men's club in Washington, where Clark Clifford, Henry Kissinger and other celebrated figures gather to dine, gossip and do business.

Such is the club's perceived status that even the most distinguished men are willing to linger for years on waiting lists for an opportunity to join. Power, money and pedigree help speed the membership process, but nothing moves it faster than having a top Administration job.

And so it is that Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis, Michael K. Deaver, deputy chief of staff at the White House and John S. R. Shad, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, have all been granted resident guest privileges. And club members were notified recently that Charles Z. Wick, director of the International Communications Agency, has just applied. Mr. Wick is being sponsored by William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, and Leonard Marks, a lawyer.

But don't expect to see Jeane Kirkpatrick on the membership rolls. Although blacks were invited into the club 10 years ago, the only permanent feminine presence is an assortment of framed Playboy pin-ups on the locker room walls.

Phil Gailey

Lynn Rosellini

Shultz and Botha get nowhere on Namibia stalemate

By BARBARA REHM

Washington (News Bureau)—Secretary of State Shultz and South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha met for more than two hours yesterday but failed to find a formula for independence and black majority rule in South African-ruled Namibia.

United States officials said the negotiations have stalled on a South African demand—supported by the U.S.—that the estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops in neighboring Angola withdraw before there can be an agreement. Angola, supported by most other African states in the region, rejected the South African demand and insisted that Pretoria withdraw its own troops from Namibia (South-West Africa).

As he left the talks with Shultz, Botha, however, called the discussions "profitable and encouraging." He said the outlook for a settlement was "promising."

The U.S. took the lead in the negotiations 17 months ago, and it appeared the Reagan administration might be able to exert leverage to achieve an agreement.

AT THE TIME the U.S. stepped in, South Africa was preoccupied with its domestic situation, right-wing extremists were challenging the government, the country was deep in recession and the guerrilla war in Namibia was costing about \$675 million a year.

But this summer Pretoria demanded the removal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Since then, Vice President Bush, CIA Director William Casey and Chester Crocker, undersecretary of state for African affairs, have traveled to Africa to break the impasse.

Diplomatic sources here said the impasse on Namibia has reached the stage where American allies—Britain, Canada, France and West Germany—are ready to bow out of the effort.

Administration officials said South Africa is committed to setting up an internal government in Namibia to strengthen South Africa's hand against the South-West Africa Peoples Organization, which has fought for Namibian independence since 1966.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 14

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 NOVEMBER 1982

US fails to budge stalled negotiations on Namibia independence

Bush unsuccessful in convincing Africans to link Angola-Cuba issue with Namibia

By Louis Wyznitzer

Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
United Nations, N.Y.

The United States has failed to budge stalled negotiations on Namibian independence — despite face-to-face dialogue in African capitals this month between top-level US and African officials.

The impasse on Namibia is so vast that the US's partners in a Western attempt to work out a settlement may bow out of the effort, diplomatic sources say. Failure of both this Western "contact group" (US, Britain, Canada, West Germany, and France) effort and of separate US efforts means that prospects for Namibian independence in the foreseeable future are dim, say these sources.

One of the key sticking points in negotiations is US insistence that Namibian independence be linked to expulsion of

Cuban troops from Angola, Namibia's neighbor to the south.

US Vice-President George Bush repeatedly insisted on a Cuban pullout as a precondition for a Namibian settlement during his tour of seven African nations, which ended this week. But Bush's African hosts told him just as firmly that the Angola and Namibia issues were separate and should not be linked.

Other officials besides Bush have also failed to gain converts to their point of view. These officials' talks with Africans appear to show there is a flurry of diplomatic activity on Namibia, but the truth of the matter is that they "mainly provided a camouflage concealing the deep existing impasse over the whole issue," says a high-ranking Western diplomat.

Besides Bush, CIA chief William Casey and Under-Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker have been in Africa. Elliot Abrahams, assistant secretary of state for human rights, is due to go to South Africa soon. In addition, Mr. Crocker has recently visited the capitals of the other four contact group members, and South Africa's Foreign Minister Roelof Botha was in Washington this week to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz.

"These meetings raise a lot of dust but apparently provide no exits from the present deadlock," says a well-informed source.

Angola, the front-line states (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, Tanzania), indeed all of Africa including pro-Western regimes such as Kenya and Nigeria, categorically reject linkage of Namibian independence and pullout of Cuban troops from Angola.

French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson also stated recently that "linkage is unacceptable." Privately Canada,

West Germany, and Britain are known to agree. For the time being, at US insistence, these contact group members have agreed not to dissolve the group. But if the US continues to insist on coupling a Cuban troop pullout with the Namibian independence — and if Angola remain adamant in rejecting that that linkage — the contact group is likely to break up. It could break up in a matter of months, say several informed and involved diplomats.

South Africa, through recent declarations by Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan, has made it clear that "it will not allow the red flag to fly over Windhoek," Namibia's capital. Pretoria now is committed to setting up a new internal government in Namibia. This, analysts say, is an effort to strengthen South Africa's hand against SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization). If free elections were held in Namibia — as has been proposed in the Namibia negotiations and by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution 435 — it is widely believed SWAPO would win. South Africa, however, considers SWAPO to be "a tool in Moscow's hands."

If South Africa rejected free elections in favor of molding its own "internal solution" on Namibia's, the world community would consider the action illegal. Resolution 435 makes the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and independence elections under UN supervision mandatory.

The Reagan administration is engaged in a race against the clock. It banks on the willingness of African states to compromise as a result of their present economic difficulties and need for American aid. "They may continue to disagree with the US approach to the Namibian issue but at the same time they are likely to mute their criticism," says one Africa watcher.

Meanwhile, the Reagan administration, while not saying so publicly, reportedly hopes that the Angolan "Marxist" leadership, under the pressure of its economic problems, will either agree to send the Cuban troops home or be toppled by Jonas Savimbi's rebellious UNITA movement. Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front it is playing for time and needs to keep the "contact group" on board, thus giving the impression that things are still moving in the right direction even if in fact they are at a standstill.

Angola and the US seem to be playing cat and mouse together. Angola's leaders appear to be deeply suspicious of the American plan and of American assurances that were the Cuban troops to go home, South Africa would no longer invade it and try to destabilize it.

"They are tempted by the American offers of aid and recognition but at the same time they are afraid to be ensnared," says one European official who just visited Angola. "They suspect that the Reagan administration would not be content to get the Cubans out but that it would want to eventually replace Angola's pro-Soviet regime with a pro-Western one," he adds.

Angolans, meanwhile, are eager to continue talking to the Americans in the hope that Washington may eventually soften its tune.

PERISCOPE

The FBI Investigates the Freeze Movement

President Reagan's charge at his press conference last week that Soviet agents are involved in the domestic nuclear-freeze movement was based on a secret Federal Bureau of Investigation study. The White House has identified the Reader's Digest and State Department reports as Reagan's sources. In fact, after reading one Reader's Digest article outlining a Soviet link with the freeze movement, the president asked the FBI to confirm the charge. The bureau reported that there is hard evidence that Moscow has tried to infiltrate and exploit the U.S. peace movement. But according to one bureau source, the report does not contend that the Kremlin inspired the movement or controls its leaders. FBI counterintelligence chief Edward O'Malley's recent testimony on the subject before the House intelligence committee is under review for possible declassification. Freeze advocates, including Republican Sen. Mark Hatfield of Oregon, have challenged Reagan's accusation. Similar charges were made repeatedly against the anti-Vietnam War movement; no significant Soviet involvement was ever proved.

The PLO's Missing Members

Israeli intelligence says it has discovered that the camps in Tunisia that accommodated 1,000 PLO guerrillas after their evacuation from Beirut are now empty. Israeli officials suspect that the fighters have made their way back to the Mideast—either to Syria or Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. American Mideast specialists say that Syria has recently tightened its border watch to prevent PLO fighters from sneaking back into Lebanon; they speculate that Syria is fearful of provoking an Israeli attack.

How to Stop Soviet High-Tech Spies

Washington's campaign to stop the Soviet theft of technology may handicap American businessmen more than the secret-snatchers, according to a Senate study to be released this week. The Senate's Permanent Investigating Subcommittee reports that the Commerce Department tries to protect so many high-tech commodities that its limited resources are spread too widely to be effective. The proposed solution: having the intelligence agencies work harder to pinpoint the particular innovations that Moscow covets most; security measures could then be concentrated on those areas. The panel also recommends that customs officers be given broader powers and that the federal wiretap law be expanded to permit easier surveillance of suspected poachers.

The CIA: In From

The Central Intelligence Agency has boosted its influence to new levels during the Reagan administration, by at least one measure. Under Director William Casey, the CIA has sharply increased its production of National Intelligence Estimates. Based on both public and secret information, the NIE's address such topics as Soviet nuclear strength, international terrorism and world oil reserves. The reports are designed to be used by policymaking officials, but they are often ignored. Nonetheless, the number of NIE's can be a rough indicator of the CIA's standing. When Jimmy Carter was president the CIA turned out about 12 a year. That number more than tripled during the first year of the Reagan administration and will probably reach 60 in 1982.

China Arms Iraq

China has set up a stall in the Middle East arms bazaar. United States intelligence officials say that China is now a major source of military supplies for Iraq. According to a new report, Iraq buys one-quarter of all its weaponry from China; that accounts for half of China's arms-export total. Most Chinese weapons are based on Soviet models, which makes it easy for Iraq to integrate the Chinese equipment into its largely Soviet arsenal.

ERIC GELMAN with bureau reports

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12

TIME
22 NOVEMBER 1982

The Soviets

TIME/NOVEMBER 22, 1982

Changing the Guard

After Brezhnev's 18-year rule, the U.S.S.R. gets an enigmatic new leader



The first hint came at 7:15 p.m. Moscow time on Wednesday. Nikolai Shchelokov, the Minister for Public Order, had just delivered a brief television address to celebrate Militia Day, and millions of Soviet viewers were awaiting the live pop concert that was supposed to follow. Instead, without explanation, a film about Lenin was broadcast. Then, at 9, came *Vremya* (Time), the nightly news. The announcers, who usually dress informally, wore dark jackets or dresses. "I ran to my neighbors to find out if they knew what was going on," a Moscow secretary said. "Everyone was excited. We all thought somebody had died, but nobody guessed it was Brezhnev. We had all seen him on television three days before, reviewing the military parade, and he looked all right."

The initial speculation centered on Politburo Member Andrei Kirilenko, 76, who was rumored to be ailing and who was absent from the traditional Kremlin lineup at the Nov. 7 ceremonies marking the 65th anniversary of the October Revolution. After the news, the nationwide first channel aired an unscheduled program of war reminiscences. On the second channel, an ice hockey game was abruptly replaced by Tchaikovsky's mournful "*Pathétique*" Symphony.

Only the next morning, at exactly 11, did Soviet radio and TV simultaneously broadcast the formal announcement: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. inform with deep sorrow the party and the entire Soviet people that Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, died a sudden death at 8:30 a.m. on Nov. 10, 1982."

Brezhnev, 75, who had held the most powerful post in the Soviet Union for 18 years, and who had been ill for nearly a decade, had died from complications of atherosclerosis affecting the heart and major vessels. He had actually died 26½ hours before the announcement was made.

A new era was beginning, one that would affect the destiny not just of the Soviet Union's 270 million citizens but of the entire world. As Brezhnev's surviving colleagues moved swiftly to fill the leadership void, they were eager to convey the impression of a smooth transition and lay to rest speculation about a power struggle.

Late Friday morning, black limousines began to converge on the Kremlin, bringing the nearly 300 bureaucrats, generals, diplomats, scientists, academicians and workers who make up the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Even before they entered the yellow-and-white Council of Ministers building, they knew what they were there to do. They would ratify the choice already made by the Politburo, that of Yuri Andropov, 68, to be Brezhnev's successor as party chief. The post has been held by only five men since the Bolshevik Revolution: Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Georgi Malenkov, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. Shortly after noon Friday, Andropov, the son of a railroad worker from the northern Caucasus, became the sixth.

Andropov was, to Western experts, by far the most controversial of the contenders. Stern and serious behind his thick spectacles, he was the Ambassador to Budapest during the Soviet army's efficient repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956. As head of the Committee for State Security (KGB) from 1967 to May 1982, he had also overseen the suppression of internal dissent. But at the same time, Andropov developed a reputation for pragmatism and sophistication, at least by Soviet standards.

As chairman of the committee designated to organize Brezhnev's funeral, Andropov gave a brief oration extolling the dead leader, who lay in state less than a quarter-mile away in the House of Trade Unions' Hall of Columns, a handsome neoclassical building that was once a club for the Russian aristocracy. "A most outstanding political leader of our times, our comrade and friend, a man with a big soul and heart, sympathetic and well-wishing, responsive and profoundly humane, is no more," Andropov intoned. After calling for a minute of silence, he continued: "Leonid Ilyich said that not a single day in his life could be separated from the af-

fairs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet country. And that was really so."

Konstantin Chernenko, 71, the silver-haired party chief administrator, then rose. As every Soviet citizen knew, Chernenko had been Andropov's main competitor for the succession. Now, in a deft and effective political gesture, the rival was moving to nominate the winner, thus symbolizing the need to close ranks. "Dear Comrades, all of us are obviously aware that it is extremely difficult to repair the loss inflicted on us by the death of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev," Chernenko said. "It is now twice, three times as important to conduct matters in the party collectively." Chernenko, a close protégé of Brezhnev's, then proceeded to nominate Andropov, whom he described as "a selfless Communist" and, perhaps with some reticence, as Brezhnev's "closest associate." The delegates approved the choice unanimously. By 1 p.m. the meeting was over, and the entire Central Committee went to the Hall of Columns to open the period of national mourning, during which Brezhnev's corpse would lie in state.

As an orchestra played Tchaikovsky, the committee members lined up in front of the catafalque where Brezhnev lay amid wreaths and flowers, with row upon row of medals pinned to cushions below his feet. After a brief formal tribute, Andropov led the Politburo members toward the dead man's family. He bent over and kissed Brezhnev's widow Victoria, 75, through her veil. She lifted a hand to her cheek to wipe away tears. Andropov bent to kiss her again, then kissed Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Kirilenko, a leading contender for the succession until sidelined in the past year, burst into tears as he spoke to Brezhnev's widow.

World leaders sent messages of condolence to the Kremlin that varied in tone. President Reagan, who had been awakened at 3:35 a.m. Thursday by National Security Adviser William P. Clark with the news of Brezhnev's death, sent a respectful two-paragraph message calling Brezhnev "one of the world's most impor-

19 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Director, Office of External Affairs

SUBJECT: CBS "60 Minutes" Profile of DCI, Request for Interview

1. Action Requested: Decline or accept request for filmed interview with "60 Minutes" (CBS) for use in a profile on you.

2. Background:

a. Ira Rosen, a producer for "60 Minutes," has requested in a telephone call to Public Affairs your participation in a filmed interview that would be used in a personality profile. The profile would focus on the rebuilding of the CIA under your administration. In addition to a sit-down interview with Mike Wallace, Rosen would like you to take Wallace on a filmed tour of parts of the Agency Headquarters facility, including such locations as the seal on the floor of the main lobby and the various wall inscriptions and memorials in the lobby. Among the topics you would be asked to address are the magnitude of the communist threat worldwide and the efforts you have undertaken to confront this threat by strengthening the CIA with the blessing of the Reagan Administration.

b. Rosen says you were asked by Mike Wallace to cooperate on such a profile in the past and you responded that you wanted to function in the DCI position for a while longer before considering such a project. Public Affairs records show that Mike Wallace initiated this request in a letter in January 1981 and followed up with a reiteration in July of that year. He was told that his name would be added to the list of such requesters.

c. Participation in this production would likely lead to a flurry of similar requests from other network TV programs. You recently demurred on a similar request from Hugh Downs.

3. Recommendation: None. Indicate whether you wish to decline or accept this interview and authorize Public Affairs to respond on your behalf.

STAT

Bill: In my judgment this could be disastrous — I am very much opposed.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1

WASHINGTON POST
12 NOVEMBER 1982

Reagan Vows Effort For Improved Ties

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan responded yesterday to the death of Leonid I. Brezhnev by calling for improved relations with the Soviet Union but turned down a proposal by his foreign policy advisers that he take what one of them called "the dramatic step" of attending the funeral of the Soviet president.

Reagan, rejecting the recommendation of Secretary of State George P. Shultz, said that Vice President Bush would head the U.S. delegation to Moscow.

Shultz had proposed that Reagan take the precedent-setting step of attending the funeral himself in an effort to improve U.S.-Soviet relations during a time of transition. "Our two nations bear a tremendous responsibility for peace in a dangerous time—a responsibility that we don't take lightly," Reagan said in a statement opening his news conference last night.

However, he emphasized—as he has many times in the past—that he believes peace can be built only on a foundation of military strength.

After reconfirming his commitment to continued negotiations with the Soviets to reduce both nuclear and conventional forces, the president said: "But we shouldn't delude ourselves. Peace is a product of strength, not of weakness—of facing reality and not believing in false hopes."

When Reagan was asked whether he would take any initiatives to reduce tensions between East and West, he responded that "it takes two to tango" and that he had already taken the first steps. The only example that he gave was the lifting of the grain embargo early in his ad-

ministration. In deciding to send Bush to Brezhnev's funeral on Monday, administration officials disclosed, Reagan sided with top members of his White House staff against the recommendation of Shultz and other key foreign policy and national security advisers.

The Shultz recommendation was strongly opposed by White House chief of staff James A. Baker III and deputy chief of staff Michael K. Deaver, according to administration sources.

These sources said that national security adviser William P. Clark, who was described by others as a "broker" in the discussion, backed Shultz, as did Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey. Those who advocated that Reagan travel to Moscow argued that it would signal his commitment to arms control and to improving strained U.S.-Soviet relations.

However, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, who have taken a hard line against the Soviets, were described as agreeing with the White House staff that Reagan should not go.

"It was a philosophic thing," said one administration official. "If there's progress made in Vienna and Geneva [in troop reduction and nuclear arms control negotiations], the president would like to visit the Soviet Union. But there's been no opening, no sign of restraint from the Russians."

Some sources said the trip also would have been grueling for the 71-year-old Reagan, who is to travel to Chicago on Saturday for a tribute to his late father-in-law, neurosurgeon Loyal Davis.

Reagan did not go into any of these reasons at his news conference. Instead, he cited scheduling conflicts, including forthcoming visits by heads of state, an apparent reference to upcoming meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

The president added that he thought it was possible to continue the "search for peace" without "my attendance at the services."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

WALL STREET JOURNAL
11 NOVEMBER 1982

American Spies Feel Left Out in the Cold, Seek Fringe Benefits

Members of Secret Task Force
Go to Court to Win Credit
For Their Years of Service

By JONATHAN KWITNY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

It may not be exactly the way Nathan Hale would have reacted but some 30 U.S. spies who were laid off four years ago are so upset at having to stay out in the cold that they have taken Uncle Sam to court over their lost pension rights and other diminished federal benefits.

The men once belonged to a super-secret Navy operation called Task Force 157 that clandestinely gathered information about maritime affairs all around the world. To facilitate their work, the Navy allowed the men to set up business fronts on their own and to recruit foreign nationals as agents.

This kind of intelligence gathering was curtailed after congressional investigations in the mid-1970s uncovered embarrassing abuses (not involving Task Force 157). But now it seems to be coming back. The Reagan administration has said that CIA Director William Casey intends to use business and commercial "cover" much more than in the past.

Says one former 157 operative: "My job was to find out what the Soviet navy was doing here, here and here (pointing to locations on a make-believe map). I had a great deal of leeway in how to go about it. If I wanted to set up a shipping company, I became president of a shipping company."

During the Vietnam War, Task Force 157 penetrated North Vietnam's transport industry, according to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the retired chief of naval operations. "157 gave us the exact schedules of ships entering and leaving Haiphong Harbor," he says, adding that this helped in planning how to mine the harbor.

Boon to Kissinger

Partly because it was small and self-contained, the task force developed such a secure system of coded communications that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger preferred it to standard embassy communications when he wanted to send messages to the White House while he was visiting foreign dignitaries.

In 1977, however, the nine-year-old task force was scrapped by Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, then the deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Even Adm. Inman, who later went on to become the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency before resigning last July, praises 157's work. He says it was just a victim of federal budget cuts.

Members of the task force were furious—and still are. More than a dozen of them agreed to interviews with this reporter, although, as might be expected, almost none wanted to be quoted by name. Spying is a secret business, and Judge John McCarthy of the Merit Systems Protection Board, a federal employee appeals body, is enforcing special secrecy around 157 pending his administrative-court decision on the federal pay status and benefit issues. His ruling is expected any day. The case—heard in total secrecy—has dragged on for four years, and the former spies say that if they lose, they will sue in federal court.

There is outspoken bitterness among some of the men who believe that dropping the task force was a maneuver of Adm. Inman to advance his own intelligence career. Others say it represented a victory for the powerful corporate suppliers of expensive "black box" satellite and electronic systems of strategic information gathering over "humint" (an intelligence-community bureaucratic term for information systems relying on human agents). They raise the possibility that the death of 157 has left the U.S. dangerously short of important strategic intelligence.

Former Spy Indicted

Muddying the arguments both pro and con about Task Force 157 is the fact that the notorious former spy Edwin Wilson, facing trial next week on federal charges of selling high-technology war materiel to Libya and other alleged crimes, was a 157 operative after his official retirement from the CIA. Mr. Wilson joined 157 as a full-time employee in 1971, and his contract lapsed on April 30, 1976, despite his efforts to continue it. Although his 157 salary is said to have been no more than \$35,000 a year, Mr. Wilson made millions of dollars through his various dealings and established a lavish estate in Virginia.

One theory is that anticipation of the Wilson scandal by Adm. Inman may have led to his axing the task force. Adm. Inman, however, says it was just luck that 157 was cut by the budget before Mr. Wilson embarrassed the Navy.

The Navy won't even say why it won't pay the claims. Comparatively little money is believed to be involved, and the fight is making a public spectacle of a supposedly secret operation. One reason may concern the use of business cover for spies. Says one former Navy supervisor, "If these guys are allowed to collect, then you are going to

have thousands, and I mean thousands, of people (spies) who work for Lockheed and everybody else going to want to collect." (Lockheed Corp. won't comment on what it says is classified information, but it is one of many companies that are known to have provided cover for U.S. spies in the past.)

The seed of 157 was an order from President Kennedy in 1962 for the Navy to gather more information about Cuba from Cuban employees at the Navy base in Guantanamo. The Navy dispatched an egg-bald, 6-foot-4, 290-pound veteran intelligence officer named Thomas Duval to get the job done. Mr. Duval looks like Daddy Warbucks but goes by the nickname "Smoke." The name refers to the oversized stogie he usually clutches, but friends say it suits his character, too.

Pick a Number

Originally an enlisted man, Mr. Duval helped U.S. intelligence forces infiltrate European maritime unions in the 1950s and was commissioned an officer. His work in Cuba was admired enough by the Navy that in 1965 it assigned him to organize a worldwide maritime spy effort. On Aug. 7, 1968, it was designated Task Force 157 (the number was arbitrary—maybe someone's room number, one operative suggests).

About 30 Navy officers and 70 civilian intelligence officers were assigned to the new group. The Navy incorporated some commercial shipping companies in Alexandria, Va., to serve as employment cover for them. Task-force members were stationed in major ports around the world. They created still other business fronts and recruited local nationals as agents.

Eventually 157 encompassed "more than 800 reporting human sources," Sen. Strom Thurmond said in a letter protesting its demise and written at the urging of Adm. Moorer, the retired Navy boss.

Besides posting informers in most of the principal ports of the world, 157 also learned a lot by infiltrating maritime unions, its former operatives say. Adm. Moorer, a strong defender of the task force, says, "It's important to know where ships are coming from, what kind of flag they're flying, what's in the hold when they offload it. There's no way you can photograph this from satellites, or even low-flying aircraft." Along with its value during the Vietnam War, "the system was useful in the Middle East, and in the India and Pakistan war" and is missed now, he adds.

Former supervisors also note 157's cheapness, especially compared with the cost of intelligence from satellites—"a drop in the bucket," says one retired admiral. Sources familiar with 157's budget say it never exceeded \$5 million a year, not counting the salaries of 30 Navy officers and the cost of electronically outfitting some boats, which the Navy paid for. The boats, disguised as pleasure yachts, shadowed Soviet and other suspicious ships and lurked around critical

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
9 NOVEMBER 1982

Haig says 'faceless' staffers did him in

United Press International

Alexander Haig yesterday attributed his ouster as secretary of state to "a range of motivations," including betrayal by "faceless people" on the White House staff.

But he declined to blame William Clark, his former top State Department aide who became White House national security adviser, for forcing his resignation last June.

Haig's remarks came in the first of a three-part interview broadcast on CBS' "Morning News."

His resignation was accepted June 25 after he disagreed with the president's decision to impose sanctions on European firms sending U.S.-licensed goods to the Soviet Union for use in a natural gas pipeline project.

He was not present at the meeting when the decision was made, he said, perhaps because "some people do not like confrontational meetings, and that's very understandable." He said it is possible Clark was saving the president from a session "in which I would have clearly taken the other side."

Haig also referred yesterday to a flap over a memo he purportedly gave to the White House just hours after the inauguration that spelled out broad powers for him in his role as secretary of state.

Haig said he and National Security Adviser Richard Allen, "in coordination with [Defense Secretary Caspar] Cap Weinberger and [CIA Director] Bill Casey, spent three weeks prior to the inauguration" and developed "with some contention as is always the case, a reflection of the consensus" of the scope of Haig's authority and duties on foreign policy.

"It was when it left that forum that all the controversy developed," said Haig, saying as far as he knew it was never presented directly to Reagan but rather to "what I refer to as a group of faceless staff people."

He also said he was "somehow, portrayed to the American press by faceless people" as a person bent on trying "to seize control of the levers of government."

Reagan has refused to discuss publicly the reasons for Haig's departure. Haig said there is "always a range of motivations when these things happen."

Asked how he thought his absence has affected U.S. policy, he replied: "If I thought it would serve a useful purpose to answer frankly your question, then I'd be shouting it to the rooftops. But I don't think it would."

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NEWSWEEK
8 NOVEMBER 1982

Is Covert Action Necessary?

Why not destabilize Nicaragua? The Sandinistas are no friends of ours. They have cozied up to Castro and Brezhnev. They have funneled arms to the leftist rebels in El Salvador. They are building an army larger than they need for their own defense. By example, if nothing else, they pose a threat to right-wing rulers in places like Honduras and Guatemala—bad guys, to be sure, but *our* bad guys, and arguably no worse than the other kind. Which is the lesser evil: to unleash a little thuggery on the Sandinistas, who play by those rules, or to wash our hands of dirty tricks, for fear of getting into deeper trouble?

Why not arm the rebels in Afghanistan? As a matter of fact, we're doing that. Why not make trouble for Muammar Kaddafi? We're doing that, too. Why not send secret financial aid to Solidarity? If we're doing that, most Americans would approve—and would rather not know. There are worse things than covert action. But if a democratic nation is to meddle in the affairs of another country, it must abide by certain rules: don't violate your own principles. Don't make things worse. Don't get caught.

Subversion: The Central Intelligence Agency defines covert action as "any clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments, organizations, persons or events in support of United States foreign policy." That covers everything from planting a pro-American editorial in a foreign newspaper to staging coups or raising secret armies. Democratic ideals often do not square with covert action. Some conspiracies launched in defense of American democracy end up subverting democracy elsewhere. In Chile, for example, the CIA destabilized the government of an elected president, Salvador Allende, a

Marxist who eventually was deposed and assassinated. But no covert action is a complete success unless it remains a secret, and secrets are hard to keep in an open society. In the case of Chile, the CIA tried to cover up by lying to Congress, and eventually a loyal American, former CIA Director Richard Helms, had to plead no contest to a false-testimony charge. Covert action *can* turn out for the best, but the only truly successful operations run by the CIA are the ones we still don't know about.

Before World War II, intelligence work consisted mostly of gathering information and thwarting enemy spies. The wartime Office of Strategic Services, the CIA's predecessor, broadened the franchise to include propaganda, political action and dirty tricks of almost every description. After the war, the CIA helped the democracies of Western Europe to stave off communist subversion by subsidizing socialists, Christian Democrats and labor unions. In its heyday, which lasted until the mid-1970s, the CIA launched literally thousands of secret programs, most of them low-budget political and propaganda operations. But it didn't hesitate to stage coups and raise private armies, especially in the Third World. There were fiascoes, notably at the Bay of Pigs. Yet the CIA also managed to overthrow leftist regimes in countries like Guatemala and Iran and to wage a long "secret war" in Laos by transforming primitive tribesmen into a surprisingly effective army.

Rebirth: In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, there was a virtual moratorium on the messier kinds of covert action. CIA operatives were discharged by the hundreds. Congress required that it be informed of every covert action. It was Jimmy Carter, the champion of human rights and open

family, running paramilitary operations in about 10 countries, including Afghanistan. The Afghanistan mission involves only a handful of CIA agents, but it has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons shipped to the rebels through third parties, such as Egypt. Two separate covert actions have been aimed at Libyan leader Kaddafi. One was designed to stir up trouble for him in Chad (Libya has since withdrawn its occupation forces from that country). The other authorized contacts with Libyan dissidents in exile, in hopes of putting together a legitimate opposition. Briefing one congressional committee, CIA Director William Casey said such activities might lead to the "ultimate" removal of Kaddafi.

As a last resort, the destabilization or overthrow of a foreign government may be necessary, whether it involves subtle subversion or something nastier. Perhaps the same result could be achieved in broad daylight by military action or overt diplomacy. But if the public doesn't want to go to war, and if diplomacy offers insufficient leverage, covert action is the only alternative to backing down. Such plots may offend a democracy's sense of decency—and seem expedient all the same. If the aim of a covert action is in line with what Americans generally consider necessary, prudent and moral, most of them will tolerate the means.

Plot: Even so, a free society should not sacrifice its principles lightly. Plots against foreigners may not be as necessary as some practitioners of the covert arts would have us believe. In 1960 the CIA decided to kill Patrice Lumumba, the former prime minister of the Congo, who appeared to be on the verge of regaining power and handing his country over to the Soviet Union. The U.S. plan to poison Lumumba was never carried out—in part, perhaps, because key CIA operatives thought murder was going too far. "I didn't regard Lumumba as the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III," CIA station chief Lawrence Devlin told a congressional committee years later. "I saw him as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that." Eventually, Lumumba was arrested by his political opponents, who announced in due course that he had been killed after escaping from jail. "Murder corrupts," said another reluctant

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8 November 1982

INTERNATIONAL

A Secret War For Nicaragua

A covert operation to restrict the flow of Cuban arms to El Salvador expands into a larger plan to undermine the Sandinista government in Managua, miring the Reagan administration deeper in Central America.

The smoky bar in Tegucigalpa was a cousin to Rick's Café in "Casablanca," a nightly gathering place for the dangerous and the desperate in Honduras. Squeezed into a corner one evening last week were four Argentine military advisers, speaking machine-gun Spanish and occasionally stealing furtive glances around the room. A half-dozen Americans stood in a loose line at the bar, drinking beer and talking too loudly about guns. In the center of the room, grouped around a table that listed far right, were seven men drinking rum. One of them wore a gold earring. He explained that the seven men were Nicara-

guan exiles who belonged to various factions of *la contra*, a band of counterrevolutionaries trying to topple the leftist Sandinista regime. They were ready to move toward Managua, one of the men said. "We just need to hear from The Boss that it's time to go." Who was The Boss? The man with the earring was impatient with stupid questions. "He's the man you call 'Mr. Ambassador'."

The envoy in question was John D. Negroponte, the American ambassador in Honduras. Official sources told NEWSWEEK last week that Negroponte is overseeing an ambitious covert campaign to arm,

train and direct Nicaraguan exiles to intercept the flow of arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. But the operation has another objective: to harass and undermine the Cuban-backed government of Nicaragua. The project traces back to Jimmy Carter's efforts to support Nicaraguan moderates. Ronald Reagan added the task of cutting the Cuban-Nicaraguan arms pipeline to El Salvador. The plot, launched mostly with popguns and *machismo*, now threatens instead to destabilize Honduras, to fortify the Marxists in Nicaragua and to waste U.S. prestige along the tangled banks of the Coco River. Worse, U.S. officials concede there is

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NICARAGUA REBELS BUILD UP STRENGTH

Increased U.S. Aid Reported
to Improve Performance
on Honduras Border

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

TEGUCIGALPA, Honduras, Nov. 6 — Nicaraguan exile groups seeking the overthrow of the Sandinist Government have sharply improved their military performance in the last six months because of stepped-up United States aid, according to Honduran and foreign officials here.

"They used to be a few improvised gangs scattered along the border," a Honduran Army officer said of the groups, which have been operating from camps in southern Honduras. "Now they have well-armed columns of up to 1,000 men penetrating deep into Nicaragua."

At the same time, the officials said that the Reagan Administration, while becoming deeply involved in training and arming the exile groups, has so far been reluctant to work with more moderate opponents of Nicaragua's Sandinist Government.

The officials also said that the Central Intelligence Agency had recently taken over from Argentine Army officers the task of advising the groups.

Indians Are Recruited

The recruitment of many Nicaragua Miskito Indians who fled into Honduras early this year swelled the exile force to over 4,000, organized in some 12 camps.

These covert operations are believed part of a broader American strategy aimed at harassing the Sandinist regime and using Honduras to prevent the spread of leftist influence from El Salvador and Nicaragua to the rest of Central America.

Only this year has the United States, which has long sought to shield this country from the turmoil in surrounding countries, begun to assign Honduras a more active role in combating revolu-

tionary forces in the region. The Honduran Army has been strengthened by United States military aid, following the buildup of the Nicaraguan armed forces. The Hondurans have also been helping the Salvadoran Army in its battle against leftist guerrillas ensconced near the Honduran border.

This policy has been enthusiastically endorsed by the head of Honduras's armed forces, Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, who is said by friends to believe that Honduras will be secure only when Nicaragua's Sandinist regime has been toppled and Salvadoran rebels have been crushed.

This approach has stirred some alarm in Honduran civilian and military circles. Some politicians here maintain that this long-stable country is being unnecessarily exposed to terrorist reprisals from El Salvador and is being led toward a military confrontation with Nicaragua. Further, some Honduran Army officers believe they would not emerge the winners of a war with Nicaragua.

Within the Reagan Administration, some officials argue that Washington should support a more moderate opposition headed by Eden Pastora Gomez, an exiled Sandinist hero known as Commander Zero, rather than remnants of the Somoza regime's national guard who fled here after the 1979 revolution.

"We're backing the wrong horse again," one official said recently. "We're playing into the hands of the Sandinists because, if anyone is hated in Nicaragua, it's the national guard."

In several attempts to reach agreement with both the United States and the Honduran Army earlier this year, Mr. Pastora and his allies, who include a former Nicaraguan junta member, Alfonso Robelo Callejas, have reportedly been rebuffed.

Somoza Link a Sticking Point

At first, according to aides to Mr. Pastora, talks broke down because an offer of help required him to work with some exile groups linked to the former Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

"We recognize that we need the United States," a Pastora aide said, "but we're not going to ally ourselves with the guard."

More recently, Mr. Pastora's group reportedly renewed its efforts to obtain United States assistance, at times through American members of Congress. But the overtures led nowhere.

By the time Mr. Pastora publicly denounced his former Sandinist colleagues in April this year, the United States was already involved in a covert operation along broad lines reportedly approved personally by President Reagan last December. Earlier this year, Administration officials were reported to have said that \$19 million had been assigned to form paramilitary units to operate out of Honduras.

Officials here said that retired General Vernon Walters, an Ambassador at Large in the State Department, played a key role in obtaining Argentine collaboration in the plan, with some of the funds sent to the Buenos Aires regime, which in turn dispatched 60 to 100 paramilitary advisers to Honduras.

After the Reagan Administration backed Britain in its dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands earlier this year, however, many of the Argentine advisers were withdrawn, prompting the United States to assume a more direct role in the counterrevolutionary operation. According to local officials, the director of the C.I.A., William J. Casey, secretly visited Honduras in May this year.

Since then, the size of the C.I.A. station in Honduras has sharply increased, Honduran officials said.

Meanwhile, the United States agreed to increase its military aid to Honduras in fiscal 1982 from a budgeted \$10.7 million to \$31.3 million. The number of United States military advisers training Honduran troops rose sharply, with a total of 95 members of the "mobile training teams" here at one point in March this year.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 NOVEMBER 1982

STAT

Counterspy Unification Bid Argued

Battle Brews Over Plans to Bring U.S. Efforts Together

By ROBERT C. TOTH,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—A major fight is brewing within the government over efforts to reform U.S. counterintelligence activities after completion of a secret study ordered by President Reagan on the threat to the nation posed by Soviet spies and other foreign agents.

A central element in the developing controversy is the question of how far the United States should move toward creating a single counterintelligence agency. Some intelligence officials believe greater centralization is needed to fight foreign spying, but others believe that such a move would rekindle old fears of a Big Brother in Washington spying on private citizens.

The presidential study of U.S. capabilities and resources in counterintelligence, overseen by William J. Casey, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made more than 100 recommendations last August, Administration officials said.

Broader Issues Ignored

And the President has ordered Casey to examine ways to implement the findings, an Administration official said.

But the study was precluded from looking into the broader, more controversial issues underlying U.S. counterintelligence performance—such as whether the various agencies in the field should be better coordinated, whether they should issue a combined analysis of collected information and, ultimately, whether they should be reorganized into a single central agency.

Instead, this broader examination has been assigned to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of 19 private citizens under the chairmanship of former Ambassador and White House counselor Anne Armstrong of Texas. It has been directed to examine all aspects of the counterintelligence picture, including possible organizational changes.

Fear of Single Agency

This has raised fears within the intelligence community that a single counterspy agency may emerge and, if given police powers and authority to keep files on Americans, would raise the specter of a national security organization to spy on U.S. citizens.

"It would become the focus not only of liberal attacks for the rest of the century, reviving ghosts of the FBI files and (former FBI chief J. Edgar) Hoover, but also a target for penetration by the Soviets," said one government official who asked not to be identified.

"Decentralization also provides a way to get competitive analyses of the threat and of other data, to avoid the government being sent off in a wrong direction without adequate review," another official said.

On the other hand, there appears to be a unanimous view in the government that improvement is needed in the present decentralized system.

As now structured, the FBI spends 80% of the nation's total

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6 NOVEMBER 1982

Report Recommends Steps To Increase Protection Against Spies

LOS ANGELES

A secret report ordered by President Reagan recommends that the United States shore up its protection against foreign spies by adding agents to follow the growing number of visiting foreign officials, a newspaper says.

The report also suggests cutting down on the travel flexibility of foreigners, the Los Angeles Times reported in Sunday editions.

In addition, it recommends measures to improve the nation's physical security and to standardize personnel security clearance criteria among various agencies, the Times said.

The report, completed in August, was overseen by Central Intelligence Agency director William Casey.

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has been assigned to consider whether a central counterintelligence organization should be formed to coordinate activities of disparate groups ranging from the CIA to the Department of Energy, which oversees nuclear weapons research.

That board is headed by former ambassador and White House counselor Anne Armstrong of Texas and includes 18 private citizens.

Some intelligence officials believe a centralized agency would better combat spying threats. Others say it would rekindle old fears of a government which, under the guise of counter-espionage, might persecute its critics, the Times said.

"It would become the focus not only of liberal attacks for the rest of the century, reviving ghosts of the FBI files and (former FBI chief J. Edgar) Hoover, but also a target for penetration by the Soviets," the Times quoted one unidentified government official as saying.

However, the newspaper said there is a unanimous view in government that the current decentralized system needs to be improved.

"There was and still is no one place in our government where the president can ask what is the true nature of the KGB threat to us, whether it is a low-grade problem or really worrying," one source told the Times. "But he can ask the strength of the Soviet economy, Soviet military order of battle and practically any other thing of the intelligence community."

Currently, the FBI gathers counterintelligence information in the United States but cannot analyze all such data collected by other national agencies.

Similar limits are placed on the CIA.

"For stopping the technology leaks to Moscow," one official said, "maybe Casey should run all the counterintelligence efforts. But now his authority stops at the water's edge, while the FBI and other agencies have the domestic responsibility."

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THE WASHINGTON POST
5 November 1982



William Casey, left, and Edwin Meese; by Craig Herndon

Victory on Wheels!

Gray's Party for Reagan's Two Years

By Lois Romano

You would have thought it was Election Night 1980 at the Century Plaza Hotel in downtown Los Angeles where the Reagan troops triumphed. Not the Watergate 48 hours after the GOP made a mediocre showing in the off-year elections.

Everyone seemed awfully happy.

Even Victory, the Republican Robot who stole the spotlight from CIA director William Casey, the guest of honor.

Last night Robert Keith Gray—the relentless publicist—hosted a formal dinner for Casey, campaign director for the presidential election. It was the second anniversary of the Nov. 4 Reagan victory. The 100 invited Republican heavies were still patting each other on the back.

Just when all political PR gimmicks seem to be exhausted in this town, leave it to Gray to come up with



Victory and Sophia Casey; by Craig Herndon

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NEW YORK TIMES

4 NOVEMBER 1982

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WASHINGTON TALK

Dinner for Casey

Not sated by Republican election-night revels, a select Administration group will climb into dinner jackets and gowns tonight and trundle over to the Watergate to honor William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, on the second anniversary of President Reagan's 1980 campaign, which Mr. Casey managed.

The host for the dinner for 100 people is Robert K. Gray, the unofficial public relations laureate of the Administration. A Gray aide promised that "something special, something very unusual and amusing" would take place during the celebration, but refused to divulge details.

Phil Gailey

Warren Weaver Jr.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Evening News STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network

DATE November 2, 1982 6:45 P.M. CITY Baltimore, Md.

SUBJECT Honduras

DAN RATHER: Much attention has been given to U.S. efforts to overtly help the non-leftist regimes of Central America. Among them, El Salvador and Honduras. Those efforts include military and economic assistance. But there also are covert efforts, as Bob Schakne reports.

ROBERT SCHAKNE: U.S. Government officials confirm that the CIA has organized and is supporting a covert military operation in Central America targeted against the left-wing Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Officials, who ask not to be identified, say the operation is based in neighboring Honduras, that it involves small-scale paramilitary forces conducting raids across the border designed to harass the Nicaraguan government.

The officials say the operation was approved by President Reagan and is strongly supported by CIA Director William Casey. On a day-to-day basis, it's being directed by U.S. Ambassador to Honduras John Negroponte.

In public, State Department officials decline to confirm or deny these reports.

The covert operation in Central America has drawn sharp criticism on Capitol Hill among members of both House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Among the most outspoken is Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy.

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: I've told the President [unintelligible] he makes a foreign policy mistake, if he wants to substitute covert activity for a good foreign policy. And I think that they'd find this is a very attractive alternative to the Soviet Union.

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